By Jordan Meadows
Staff Writer
Flint, Michigan’s water crisis, now widely recognized as one of the most severe public health failures in modern U.S. history, emerged from a convergence of long‑standing environmental neglect, economic decline and government decision‑making that prioritized cost savings over public safety. Although the crisis captured national attention in 2015 and 2016, subsequent investigations and court proceedings have made clear that its roots stretch back years earlier — and that its consequences continue to shape the city today.
Long before lead was detected in Flint’s drinking water, the city was struggling with deep structural challenges. Once a booming industrial hub and the birthplace of General Motors, Flint’s population peaked at nearly 200,000 in the mid‑20th century. As auto plants closed and jobs disappeared in the late 20th century, residents moved away, property values collapsed and the tax base shrank. By the early 2010s, Flint’s population had fallen to about 100,000, a majority of whom were Black, with roughly 40 percent living in poverty and thousands of homes abandoned.
Environmental problems also predated the crisis. The Flint River, which runs through the city, had for more than a century served as a dumping ground for industrial waste, treated and untreated sewage, agricultural runoff and landfill leachate. The river’s poor water quality was well known locally; it was widely rumored to have caught fire on at least two occasions.
In 2011, facing a $25 million budget deficit, Flint was placed under state control by then‑Gov. Rick Snyder. An emergency manager — an unelected official with authority over local policy — was appointed to cut costs. In 2012 and 2013, city and state officials began exploring ways to reduce spending on water service, including ending Flint’s long‑standing contract with the Detroit Water and Sewerage Department.
In April 2013, Flint formally decided to join the Karegnondi Water Authority, which planned to build a new pipeline from Lake Huron. The move was projected to save the region about $200 million over 25 years. Until the pipeline could be completed, officials opted for a temporary water source: the Flint River.
On April 25, 2014, Flint switched its water supply from Detroit’s treated Lake Huron water to the Flint River. Almost immediately, residents complained that their tap water was brown, foul‑smelling and foamy. Tests soon revealed elevated levels of trihalomethanes, E. coli bacteria and, eventually, lead. Despite these warning signs, city and state officials repeatedly assured residents that the water was safe to drink.
What officials failed to do — and later acknowledged — was treat the Flint River water with corrosion‑control chemicals. The river water was significantly more corrosive than Detroit’s water, and without proper treatment it ate away at the protective lining inside aging lead pipes. Microscopic lead particles then leached into the drinking water in thousands of homes and businesses.
As the city remained on Flint River water for 18 months, the damage worsened. Later studies showed that the switch contributed to a doubling — and in some neighborhoods a tripling — of elevated blood lead levels among Flint children. High lead exposure is particularly dangerous for children and pregnant women, and is associated with learning disabilities, behavioral problems and long‑term cognitive harm.
The water crisis was compounded by a deadly outbreak of Legionnaires’ disease between June 2014 and October 2015. The outbreak sickened at least 87 people and killed 12, becoming the third‑largest Legionnaires’ outbreak ever recorded in the United States. Public health experts later linked the outbreak to failures in water treatment and insufficient chlorine levels in Flint’s distribution system.
It was not until October 16, 2015 — after months of citizen complaints, independent testing by researchers and reporting by journalists — that Flint switched back to Detroit’s water system. By then, however, the city’s pipes were so corroded that lead continued to contaminate drinking water even after the source was changed.
In early 2016, President Barack Obama declared a federal state of emergency in Flint, and bottled water and filters were distributed to residents. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention estimated that nearly 100,000 Flint residents had been exposed to lead. Criminal charges were later brought against several state and local officials in connection with the crisis, though those cases were eventually dismissed.
A coalition that included Flint resident Melissa Mays, Concerned Pastors for Social Action, the Natural Resources Defense Council and the ACLU of Michigan sued city and state officials under the Safe Drinking Water Act. The lawsuits sought safe drinking water, proper testing and treatment, and the replacement of all lead service lines in the city. In November 2016, a federal judge ordered the government to provide every Flint household with either bottled water delivery or properly installed and maintained faucet filters.
In 2021, the state of Michigan agreed to a $626 million settlement resolving most civil lawsuits related to the crisis. The settlement created a compensation fund for more than 26,000 claimants, prioritizing children who were exposed to lead during critical developmental years. Children six and under at the time of the crisis were allocated more than 64 percent of the fund, with some eligible for awards approaching $100,000. Adults with documented injuries, property owners and businesses were also included.
Infrastructure work has also progressed. As of recent court filings, the state reports that more than 11,000 lead pipes have been replaced and over 28,000 properties restored. Roughly 4,000 homes are believed to still have lead service lines, primarily vacant properties or homes whose owners opted out of replacement.
